If we are free to adjust our concepts of things to the forms of things themselves, why should we not be free to fit language to the more exact expression of more exact concepts?
system's sake. Bacon, for one, denigrated Descartes's classification systems as "idols of the human mind"" and called instead for a process of inductive logic that moved from the physical world to the realm of general rules." Induction, he explained, worked to prioritize a sensory and experimental assessment of things before proceeding to the realm of language, communication, and universalization. Yet the positions taken by Descartes and Bacon are not, perhaps, as polarized as they may seem at first.
In the modern period, much has been made of the potential clash of inductive and deductive approaches. For example, Carol Armstrong, among others, has argued for the nineteenth-century positivist elaboration of this same clash in the work of philosophers like Auguste Comte. Armstrong explains that "induction rests on and requires deduction, that deduction is the ground of induction, that any a posteriori movement between facts and their interpretation requires an a priori base even to begin."''' I want to suggest that an earlier incarnation of this fraught interdependence emerged in Comenius's work. The collision of method and experimentalism sets the stage for the Orbis Pictiis, which can be understood as an exemplification of the interference universal ordering and direct experience produce in each other's ways of working. If Comenius's project seeks to negotiate, as I will argue, between deduction and induction, it does so by attempting simultaneously to endorse an abstract system of names, grammars, and classifications and to legitimate tangible specificities.
In fact, it can be argued that pedagogy was the ideal ground from v\hich to test the validity of the positions offered by these competing schools of thought. Comenius"s experiment ran something like this; the child, conceived of as a blank slate, encounters both the natural and represented worlds, which are inevitably misaligned.
The Orbis Pictus sought their realignment in order to ensure that neither the real nor language was sacrificed.
With the child's direct experience ostensibly protected, the aim was to integrate him into the communicative systems through which his experience could best be expressed and understood by others. Hence, the Orbis Pictus emphasizes so-called Pansophy, the universal laws revealing the harmony in all, and Panglottia, the appropriate language in which to convey such laws." Comenius's collapse of experience and method prompts a number of questions: can the universal impose order while still acknowledging the individual's direct experiences? And, by the same token, does subjectivity leave room for mutual understanding in language?
In order to study this unexpected coupling of concepts like the subjective and the universal, experience and language, and induction and deduction in the Orbis Picius, it is necessary to consider its theological and philosophical context. Comenius, along with fellow members of the Philosophical Language Movement, was deeply affected by the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). A territorial drama whose onset in Eastern Europe stemmed from skirmishes between Catholics and Calvinists in Bohemia, this very long war came to involve most of the European continent. The religious and political stakes, which were driven by continual conflict between the Holy Roman Empire and Lutherans (in Germany. Denmark. Sweden, and the Netherlands) as well as the Hapsburg threat to French interests, were resolved in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Comenius and his colleagues found themselves caught between their Protestant beliefs and a desire to assuage the Catholic opposition in order to maintain the tenuous peace brokered in 1648. Key to this particular group's experience of these years was the tension surrounding Catholic sacraments such as the Eucharist (the raising and consuming of the host), which honors the forsaking of Christ's mortal body for the redemption of man. At the heart of the conflict between Protestant and Catholic world views was a markedly different understanding of the ritual's symbolic meaning and mechanisms."' Following Catholic dogma, the host is Christ's body (his actual flesh and blood) and the Eucharist, an act engi-neered by Him; the divine (the body of Christ, the presence of God) resides in an actual object from the world (the host, this rite) -and the relationship between the two requires no mediation whatsoever. This, in other words, is induction at work: the host does not symbolize Christ so much as it makes Him manifest, each congregation member accessing or, more to the point, inducing the Holy presence during ritualized consumption.
For Catholics, then, the direct experience of Christ's body in the host becomes a universal truth, ahistorical and independent of linguistic and cultural variables. By contrast, Protestant Reformers foregrounded the problem of language and symbolic representation where Chrisfs presence in the host was concerned. They argued that the sacrament was ultimately a performative act undertaken by a congregation whose faith sat between signifier (host) and signified (Christ's body). Thus they insisted on a clear-cut distinction between bread and wine on the one hand, and on rites, signs, and words, on the other. This splitting apart of signifier and signified, reinforced by an insistence on the representational nature of the Eucharist, introduced the idea of mediation into the workings of faith and thereby brought to light the problem of representation itself Catholic induction, it can be argued, was necessarily transformed by Reformers into a form of deduction; to their minds, the system of faith, and its pronouncements concerning the presence of Christ in the host, was one that left signifier and signified, language and experience, irrevocably distinct -and it was only the congregation's ritualized leap of faith that made Christ appear.'' Not surprisingly, it was also during this period that the Philosophical Language Movement grappled with processes of signification. Its members sought out a universal language (somewhat akin to the mechanics of the Catholic belief system), whose "real character" would close the gap between words and the things and events they denoted. Ideally, language would have only one word for each thing-and so would eradicate the discrepancy between subjective experience and generalized discourse. If the Reform movement acknowledged the leap of faith in the adherence of representations to the phenomena they described (in their case, the host to Christ's presence), the Counter Reformation and the Philosophical Language Movement believed, or at least hoped, that structures of representation (the host and language respectively) emerged directly and truthfully from the world. To put it another way: where processes of signification were concerned, the Reformation and the Philosophical Language Movement were curiously at odds. This left someone like Comenius, who belonged to both, in an altogether difficult position -a position whose ramifications conspicuously surfaced in the unexpected pairing of induction and deduction, of contingent experience and universal system, to be detected in the Orhis Piclus.
In order to address such an unexpected pairing, it is helpful to turn to the description, in Foucault's The Order of Things, of the historical transition from a so-called ternary system of representation to a binary one.'* Foucault explains that the ternary system, which reached its apogee during the Renaissance, was based on a process of signification whereby objects were composed of a significant, a signified, and their conjuncture. In other words, Foucault is arguing for a state of affairs in which a material object (such as a table or the host) was integral to the word or concept (such as table or Christ) that identified it -and thus things were indistinguishable from their names. It was in the seventeenth century that signs were "lodged" no longer in things but in systems of representation:
[Sjigns are now set free from that teeming world throughout which the Renaissance had distributed them. They are lodged henceforth within the confines of representation, in the interstices of ideas, in that narrow space in which they interact with themselves in a perpetual state of decomposition and recomposition. As for similitude, it is now a spent force, outside of the realm of knowledge." "[Signs] lodged henceforth within the confines of representation": the binary system Foucault is describing as emerging in the Baroque period rests on representation's newfound capacity to tatce the place of similitude -to mark a new distance between things and language that severs direct experience from its expression. Such a system would seem to heighten the urgency of the promise made by the Orhis Rictus to "guide thee thorow All... shew thee All. . . Name thee All."'" Guide.' the systems that order the descriptions of things apprehended in the world. Show: things themselves. Name: the systems of description newly conjoined through representation with things themselves. In view of this agenda that takes its reader to school by guiding, showing, and naming, the next sections of this essay will attempt to understand the structure of the Orhis Piclits by means of Foucault's paradigm -that is. by means of the historical shift he describes from a ternary to binary system, from faithful similitude to abstract representation (in language and image). The following pages set out to discover the extent -and limits -of Foucault's usefulness for interpreting a text that struggles with the semantic alignment of representation and experience.
The Orbis Picliis opens and closes with plates dedicated to the art of deduction and its role in Comenius's pedagogy. Entitled "Invitation" and "The Close." the first and last plates repeat the same image. In its role as first plate, the image shows a child (the Pupil) looking up at a man (the Master) who points to the world and thereby announces the journey they are about to undertake through a landscape whose background is defined by a small town ( Fig. 1 ). With God's help, the Master lays out his lesson plan: "Before all things, thou oughtest to learn the plain sounds, of which man's speech consisteth. Which living creatures know how to make, and thy Tongue knoweth how to imitate, and thy hand can picture out. Afterwards, we will go into the world, and we will view all things."-' In this order of pedagogy, the Pupil will first learn conventions for speaking, imitating, and picturing. Once these conventions have been mastered, the Pupil is prepared to "go into the world" and "view all things." While the last plate reiterates the first, it now suggests the parting of Master and Pupil: "Thus thou hast seen in short, all things that can be shewed, and hast learned the chief Words of the English and Latin Tongue. Go on now and read other good Books diligently, and thou shalt become learned, wise, and godly."--Presumably after the journey, the Pupil will return to language and "read diligently." The experienced world of things is here neatly bracketed by language at its beginning and end. And if the student is permitted to explore other modes of pedagogy, induction for instance, its practice will be confined to the limits imposed by the deductive brackets strategically positioned at the book's opening and closing.
As the structure of the book makes clear, the carefully choreographed relationship between deductive and inductive modes of pedagogy established in the introduction and conclusion also orders the sequence of plates; the plates move from the Christian belief system -God, heaven, and world -organizing life on earth to descriptions of the natural world and daily life to moral ideals (ethics, prudence, judgement, or diligence). This sequential division of the Pupil's extra-worldly and worldly encounters into systems, things, and ideals may be described first as a deduction in which things are initially defined through and by the Christian system to which they belong, then as an induction in which the observation of daily life leads to abstract moral values. Accordingly, in the book's first group of plates ("God," "The Heaven," and "The World"), each of which is <i) presented in a circular frame, the Master introduces the Christian system as a guide with which the Pupil can understand the order of things he will encounter on their journey. Word and image thus establish the inventory that the rest of the text will go on to detail and the hierarchy that organizes it. A plate like "The World," for example, which stratifies stars, clouds, birds, water, beasts, and men, is reiterated by the descriptive list below it ( Fig. 2 ). Here, Comenius concludes: "Thus the greatest Bodies of the World, the four Elements, are full of their own Inhabitants."'' The order of things, then, is set into play visually and te.xtually by an insistence that the different species inhabit distinct strata, and that these strata have a hierarchical relationship to each other (e.g. land and water are below sky). Only with this kind of buffer in place can the Master then slmuthe Pupil, in the book's second group of plates, plants, beasts, and man. These pages picture the elements, plants, living creatures, man. his body, his occupations, his environment, his achievements, and his learning. Their showing, however, is not neutral; the order of their presentation is always shaped by the system to which they belong ("God." "The Heaven." and "The World"). The last group of plates, which turns to a set of moral values, is composed of elements found in the book's previous sections. This is where the Master is faced with the daunting task of teaching abstract ideas to his Pupil -and in order to do so, he uses the words and images that the rest of the book has established, combining them in new ways to present what are utterly intangible concepts like "Temperance" and "Fortitude." As we shall see, Comenius attempts in this last section to make our understanding of these concepts as universal as our apprehension of such things as flowers and, in the process, to make naming-through word and image -more closely related to the things it aims to describe.
This oscillation between deduction and induction, it will be argued, is also accompanied by an oscillation between what Foucault calls binary representation and ternary similitude. That is to say. Comenius's God-World-Heaven system, in which preexisting abstract symbols like "God" are free of attachment to concrete things, is later followed up by the naming of values whose representation is composed of the images and words for concrete things that the Pupil has just seen and learned.
To picture "God" is no simple task and this is what Comenius sets out to do in the first set of plates devoted to guiding (Fig. 3 ). Without any clear referent in the world of things, the divine is imagined differently by all religious and cultural groups. Conjoining Christian. Jewish. Muslim, and pagan symbols. Comenius's God aims to speak across religious and cultural divides. Pagan circles, stars, light, and signs of infinity surround Christian representations of the Trinity, and Hebrew letters spelling out the name of God and thanks. Muslim stipulations that religious description rely on the language of abstraction as opposed to that of resemblance are also respected.
The plate dedicated to God is unique in Comenius's book in that it is the only one whose picture does not contain numbers linking its elements to a text running beneath or beside it. Even the other prefatory plates of "The Heaven" and "The World" are designed in the same manner as those in the rest of the book. In the case of God, though, word and image run in parallel lines that never intersect. Unlike representations of birds, for instance, with their stable and shared signifieds in the natural world. God has no such natural reference point, leaving his image vulnerable to flights of subjective fancy. Natural things, by contrast, set into play a kind of hierarchy between image and word; by this I mean that images of nature bear some kind of resemblance to the things they describe while words do not. In the representation of God, however, neither images nor words have the benefit of a mimetic connection to the signified deity. This puts the latter plate in a unique position, for here word and image are equally inadequate to the task at hand. If God comes before the image and word hierarchy, then it follows that the plate dedicated to His presentation cannot cross-reference a more primary image with a narrative text. This plate is exceptional in another important way as well. The phrase "a Light inaccessible; and yet ail in all," which appears in the text below the image, describes the mechanics and meaning ofthe concentric circles emanating out from Christian and Jewish symbols to become rays of light cast on "all." Terms like "Being," "Essence," "Personality," "Will," "Power," "Goodness," and "Wisdom" introduced here resonate throughout the rest ofthe book, reappearing in countless other plates such as "Patience," "Humanity," and "Society Betwixt Man and Wife." In Comenius's view ofthe world, God and his image inaugurate a system from which everything else is necessarily deduced -and the imaging of this foundational principle, furthermore, exemplifies Foucault's binary system at work. Signifier and signified touch at absolutely no point, with abstraction signaling the way in which representation marks a ilishincc from and not a fit with the object that lies at its source.
Yet despite the emphasis on deduction, abstraction, and world orders with which the book begins, it is in the second group of plates -those in which the Master takes the Pupil "into the world" to "view all things" -that we begin to detect inductive processes at work. Consider the plate entitled "Serpents and Creeping Things" (Fig. 4 ).
Here we see a landscape populated by snakes and lizards with mountains and a forest in the background as well as a house on the right hand side that is cut off by the frame. In contrast to the image of God, the representation ofthe reptilian world depends as much as it can on a language of imagined resemblance. Viper, salamander, and lizard are meant to look like the things they point to. Moreover, as much as these pictures (of dragons in particular) are based on conventionalized understandings developed in fairy-tales and other myths, they still refer to things believed to exist in the world. Another important distinction between this plate and the plate describing God is its relationship to the text. Text and image are cross-referenced here by means of a set of numbers that appear in both. The reader's motion back and forth between the image and the list that accompanies it forecasts the conjuncture between significant (the word and image describing a viper) and signified (the viper the word and image point to) described by Foucault's ternary system; that is to say, representation rests on resemblance and thus things speak their names. That name, "Serpents and Creeping Things," appears above and below the image in Latin and the vernacular respectively -and inevitably affects our understanding ofthe image. The terms carry with them a set of preconceptions: about the primitive, the fantastical, and the world before man. The image, in turn, is configured to support and elaborate just such a reading. It is divided into two parts: on one side, a primordial mountainous scene, horizontal in feel, replete with water and "great stones" in which snakes, adders, and vipers "creep by winding themselves" and "killeth with breath ... and poysonous tail"; on the other side (and this is left unmentioned in the text), a house whose vertical fa(;ade earmarks the presence of man. '^R ough/civilized, horizontal/vertical, beast/ man: these binaries structure our apprehension ofthe image, making of serpents and creeping things an objectlesson, and it is here that we can begin to detect induction at work. That is to say, the composition of things in the image suggests a world order (a system of relationships or hierarchies); the opposition of rough and civilized puts into place a set of values to be taken up again in the next group of plates devoted to moral ideals. Reinforcing this turn towards induction, words under the image detail what is pictured, specifying location in the world and position in the order of things. "The water-snake in the water," "The boa in Houses": the locales inhabited by reptiles point to other plates ("The Water" and "A House"), and we thereby move from specific things (water-snakes and boas) to their environments (water and houses).
Following the lead ofthe images in the second group of plates, the culmination ofthe Oihis Piclii.s is the repre-
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Scrpcnis and Creeping things. sentation of the values and abstract ideals governing man's relationship to the natural world and other men -and the last group of plates grapples with this challenge. The plate entitled ""Liberality" is typical of those devoted to the description of qualities, which, like God, are without referents in the natural world ( Fig. 5 ). Here we see a large woman surrounded by other smaller figures in a landscape. The assembly of so many figures in one landscape already indicates to us that the idea being described has something to do with man's relationship to other men. In this sense, it is similar to the plates devoted to ""The Seven Ages of Man," ""The Society betwixt Parents and Children," '"The Society betwixt Masters and Servants," and "Regal Majesty." Unlike these other plates, however, which use a single scale for all of the figures pictured, here one figure is three times larger than all of the others. The tatter's size and the captions tell us that she personifies Liberality, and her particular attitude towards wealth (symbolized throughout the image by coins) is contrasted with what is identified as "the covetous man" foraging in the forest on the left side of the landscape, "the prodigal" (just to the right of Liberality) proudly and carelessly dropping precious coins on the ground, and "want" extending his empty hat to Liberality.
Liberality herself wears a benevolent expression as she lets coins fall into the hat "want" extends in her direction. The attitude towards wealth being exalted here is further described by the surrounding objects. The chest on which Liberality's left foot rests and the luxurious fabrics draped across her body together suggest that she is someone who cares about material possessions while her winged hand symbolizes an angelic or generous nature.
What Conienius attempts to do here is rather astounding. Relying only on the inventory of things shown and named earlier in the book, he sets out to describe for his Pupil the proper and necessary relationships among them. The figures, plants, and coins represented in earlier plates are now related to each other; for instance, man (woman here) ""cloaketh. nourisheth. enrieheth. these [other beings and his environment] with a chearful countenance, and a winged hand."-* What this suggests is that abstract qualities like Liberality are composed out of and induced from the things in the second part of the Orhis Piciiis -man. animals, and plants initially deduced from the God-World-Heaven system. That Liberality ""keepeth a mean about Riches, which she honestly seeketh, that she may ha\e somev\hat to bestov\ n on them that want" is a complex idea that Conienius wants to communicate by using previously described things.
-" Yet somehow the whole-the concept of "Liberality"-exceeds its parts (those previously described things). Man, woman, coins, and a forest do not simply inhabit the same frame here, for something else is at work; that is, a rule of social conduct. Man and woman are meant to relate to nature, money, and each other in a very particular manner; charitable but not wanton, generous but not careless, careful but not miserly. In the plate ""Serpents and Creeping things," we discern a set of preconceptions about the world -the opposition of rough and civilized, for instance -in the image's composition. The process of the induction of ""Liberality" from a sustained study of its parts is also inevitably affected by a set of organizational biases -the Christian belief system -that run from the book's opening plates all the way through to its conclusion. This system, then, shapes not only the representation of a woman or coins, but also the relationship between them. Induction can never be rid of deduction, and experience can never isolate itself from the realm of language and universality. Yet still there is the hope on Comenius's part that complex moral ideals might-at least in part-be rooted in the experienced world rather than in language, that a shred or trace of the conjuncture of significant and signified characterizing Foucault's ternary system might surface despite the efficiency of a binary representation in which systems of description have completely taken over the experienced world. Hence a last question remains: without the first three plates of the Orbis Piclus in place, would an idea like ""Liberality" be comprehensible at all?
The answer to this question remains unclear. In the Orhis Picitis. the Pupil is given little access to induction, ternary similitude, and the direct experience of the world they promise. In fact, even the book's second group of plates -the so-called things which speak their names -are buffered at their beginning and end by pictures and words only arbitrarily connected to referents (the book's first and third groups of plates). The Pupil thus encounters the possibility of a world unprocessed by representation only to meet the orders that be at every turn.
If deduction and induction, and binary representation and ternary similitude can be seen to be engaged in some manner of a struggle in the Orhis Piciiis. it is one in which the decks are already stacked, so to speak, in favor of deduction, binary representation, and the status quo. Given Comenius's historical context, neither the Orhis Picliis's simultaneous avowal of representation and experience nor the particulars of the relationship it forges between them is surprising. Comenius's exposure to the Reformation, the Philosophical Language Movement, and their conflicting notions of signification helps to explain his own contradictory position with regards to representation. While Reformers accepted representation as a given, those who ascribed to the Philosophical Language Movement hoped that things might again speak their names without the interference of the system of language. If the former admitted that language and systems of representation more generally necessarily mediated mutual understanding (in the sacrament of the Eucharist, the Congregation's agreement about Christ's presence rather than his actual presence is at stake), the latter believed that this common ground could be reached through a simple and direct engagement with things that would speak their names in the same way to everyone and hence define a universal language. For Reformers, language enabled experience -faith allowed all worshippers to encounter Christ's presence or something close to it. For members of the Philosophical Language Movement, the experience of things speaking their names-and doing so consistently-became universal language, and hence, faith in God's ubiquitous presence. If Comenius and his Orhis Piciiis were influenced by both of these agendas -an investment in language and a foregrounding of experience -his project stipulated that language contain experience. The very structure of the book speaks to this; the three sets of plates point up. each in turn, binary representation, then ternary similitude, then binary representation once more only to ensure that experience is kept in check by language. The Pupil is given a system within which to position direct encounters, and potentially conflicting interpretations of the world are thereby prevented from disturbing mutual understanding and order. Hence when the Pupil is given the chance to "go out into the world and view all things," it is only once language has been established to offset the threat of difference and subjectivity. Perhaps this was among the lessons learned by Comenius during decades of religious warfare; only from the safe confines of a well-defined and widely accepted system of representation was unguided exploration possible. Induction, we learn as Comenius's Pupil, is a dangerous practice without the framework of deduction. According to Foucault, Baroque representation eclipsed the dangerous possibility that experience might overtake language. The binary paradigm he describes as being inaugurated during this period finally separated the world from its description, rendering the connections between things and the words used to describe them completely arbitrary. Once things and their representations were utterly divorced from each other, the former was rendered passive while the latter grew more powerful. Experience was thenceforth no longer situated in a pure and undisturbed realm, preceded as it was by a language that overpowered and universalized it. After this shift, to Foucault's mind, the ternary system and its prioritization of experience over representation became a historical relic.
Comenius's Orbis Pictus potentially represents an exception to Foucault's model of irreconcilable binary and ternary systems. To be sure. Comeniiis looked to the binary system, and to representation itself, as the necessary framework for direct experience. Lest we forget his advice: "Before all things, thou oughtest to learn the plain sounds, of which man's speech consisteth. Which living creatures know how to make, and thy Tongue knoweth how to imitate, and thy hand can picture out. Afterwards, we will go into the world, and we will view all things." "Plain sounds." "pictures," and then "the world." or. language, representation, and then experience: Comenius clearly believed that a thing's expression in language and image would not entirely neutralize the PupiTs subsequent experience of it.
Foucault would likely suggest that this so-called experience-those moments in the Orbis Pictus when the world leaches us how to speak itself~is only another invention of representation, perhaps even the very justification for its own enterprise. Yet what I want to underscore is that in Comenius's book, the two systems are inevitably transformed by each other's presence. Binary representation is understood to bear the imprint o\' its ternary predecessor, and is thereby called upon to protect its last vestiges. For Foucault, the simultaneity inherent in Comenius's schema is absolutely implausible -once the world is represented, it can no longer be experienced and the two options are seen to be mutually exclusive. When representation strikes, "order" usurps "things.'' Yet if the Orbis Pictus is ultimately problematic for The Order of Things, it is because "things" can make "orders" too. and so the line Foucault draws between ternary and binary representation risks losing a little of its clarity.
